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Euthanasia advocates often assert a distinction between dying with dignity (good) and suicide 
(bad), drawing on the community’s twin commitment to both permitting euthanasia in some 
circumstances, and preventing suicide. But rather than being distinct, euthanasia and suicide 
are points on a continuum of death decisions, that overlap uncomfortably where intractable 
mental suffering is asserted as grounds for assisted dying. 
The tension between the two was played out this week in the Northern Territory, where the 
local Civil and Administrative Tribunal is considering whether to uphold the Medical Board 
of Australia’s suspension of Philip Nitschke’s medical licence after a three-day hearing. 
The suspension came after Nitschke discussed assisted suicide with 45-year-old Perth man 
Nigel Brayley even though he knew Brayley did not have a terminal illness. Brayley 
reportedly told Nitschke in an email that he was “suffering” in the sense that he was deeply 
unhappy in his life. Nitschke did not refer to him to a psychiatrist or offer any other help. 
More complex than it appears 
Nitschke’s actions have been roundly criticised, particularly by other euthanasia advocates, 
who seek to distance themselves from existential justifications for assisted suicide. However 
the idea that euthanasia should not be offered for mental suffering is not universally agreed, 
and requires some further consideration. 
In the Netherlands and Belgium where euthanasia is legal, assisted dying for emotional 
suffering is permitted. Approval will only be granted where where applicants are of age, 
mentally competent and their suffering constitutes an “incurable condition” that causes 
continuous and unbearable anguish. 
Of the 1,432 recorded cases of euthanasia in Belgium in 2012, 52 were on psychological 
grounds. In the Netherlands, the figure was 42 out of a total of 4,829 cases in 2013. 
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Still, the idea – and practice – remains deeply controversial. Concern often focuses on a lack 
of confidence in the notion that mental illness or emotional pain should ever be regarded as 
“incurable”. A troubling question then arsies as to whether we might be too carelessly 
priviliging the right to autonomy, and undermining our responsibility to protect vulnerable 
people from harm. 
Others have suggested that if we extend the right to die beyond those who are actually already 
dying, we risk setting off down a “very dangerous path and one that’s extremely slippery”. This 
worry seems to be that we slide into a situation in which marginalised and vulnerable people’s right 
to life will not be sufficiently protected. 
A fine line 
But too stringent an approach risks locking people with mental illnesses out of the right to make 
decisions about the end of their lives – and this might be discriminatory. 
In a troubling 2012 UK case, for instance, a hospital was ordered to cease a palliative care program 
consented to by a 32-year-old woman with anorexia nervosa and to forcibly re-feed her despite her 
deep distress at the prospect. The woman had consistently refused re-feeding over the past several 
years, experiencing it as a violent assault. 
The court decided the fact that she had an eating disorder made her incompetent to make a legally 
enforceable decision to refuse treatment. The implication of the decision was that, by definition, 
people with anorexia cannot make an end-of-life decision, no matter how harrowing and intractable 
their illness becomes. 
It was a conclusion that bitterly disappointed the woman’s parents, who said: 
It seems strange to us that the only people who don’t seem to have the right to die when 
there is no further appropriate treatment available are those with an eating disorder. 
Nitschke may well have made errors in his assessment of Brayley. These will be considered by the 
tribunal. But he had a reasonable point when he said that he had suffered a “political deregistration” 
because “a government board … doesn’t agree with the beliefs of its citizens”. Certainly there are a 
range of defensible views on what is a good life and when assisted dying is acceptable. In any case, 
the fact remains that assisted dying for mental suffering is a long way from achieving broad 
acceptance in Australia. 
 
